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Education for women: a consideration of the philosophical 
issues in dialogue with Martha Nussbaum 
In some countries in the world, education for women is con-
sidered to be unnecessary, undesirable or in conflict with reli-
gious principles. Contrary to these points of view, Martha Nuss-
baum argues that education is important and good. It is one of 
the capabilities which women need to live a flourishing life.  
According to Nussbaum, education is a universal value. Plura-
lists, however, are of the opinion that considering education to 
be a universal value, in fact, constitutes the imposition of a 
western value on other cultures. They consider this to be 
wrong. Nussbaum agrees with this, arguing that we should 
respect other cultures and that it is not her aim to impose 
values on them.  
In this article, I will investigate how Nussbaum seeks to recon-
cile her universalism (education as universal value) with the 
pluralist respect for the choices made in other cultures. I begin 
by describing Nussbaum’s view of education as a capability. I 
then discuss three examples of arguments through which Nuss-
                                      
1 In her work in South Africa and in Canada and in her functions as Professor of 
Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy Department at Potchefstroom University 
and as Vice-President of Redeemer College, Elaine Botha has contributed 
greatly to Christian higher education. Equally important, she is in all respect a 
wonderful person. I am, therefore, honoured to be able to write an article for this 
festive edition of Koers which seeks to celebrate Elaine Botha’s work. 
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baum attempts to close the gap between universalism and plu-
ralism as well as her notions of context and practical judge-
ment. 
In conclusion, I argue that although Nussbaum has made a sig-
nificant contribution to the universalism-pluralism debate, these 
two positions have not been completely reconciled.  
Opsomming 
Opvoeding vir vroue: ’n besinning oor die filosofiese kwessies 
in gesprek met Martha Nussbaum 
Die opvoeding van vroue word in sommige lande as onnodig 
beskou, onwenslik of in stryd met godsdienstige beginsels. 
Hierteenoor argumenteer Martha Nussbaum dat opvoeding ’n 
belangrike en goeie waarde op sigself is. Dit is een van die 
bekwaamhede wat vroue benodig om ’n vervulde lewe te lei. 
Volgens Nussbaum is opvoeding ’n universele waarde. Daar-
teenoor betoog sommige pluraliste dat die beskouing van 
opvoeding as universele waarde in werklikheid neerkom op die 
afdwinging van ’n westerse kulturele waarde op ander kulture. 
Volgens hulle mag dit nie gebeur nie. Nussbaum is dit hiermee 
eens en betoog dat ander kulture gerespekteer behoort te word 
en dat dit nie haar bedoeling is om waardes op hulle af te dwing 
nie. In hierdie artikel toon ek aan hoe Nussbaum probeer om 
haar universalisme (opvoeding as universele waarde) te ver-
soen met die pluralistiese respek vir die keuses wat in ander 
kulture gemaak word. Eers word Nussbaum se siening van 
opvoeding as bekwaamheid (“capability”) beskryf. Daarna kom 
drie argumente aan die beurt aan die hand waarvan Nussbaum 
die kloof tussen universalisme en pluralisme, sowel as haar 
opvattings oor konteks en praktiese oordeel, probeer oorbrug.  
Ten slotte word argumenteer dat Nussbaum ’n betekenisvolle 
bydrae tot die universalisme-pluralisme debat gelewer het, 
maar dat hierdie twee posisies nogtans nie heeltemal versoen 
is nie. 
1. Introduction 
Education for women is, even in the West, a relatively recent pheno-
menon. It is only at the end of the nineteenth century that European 
women were allowed to attend universities. For the general popu-
lation, however, higher education for women is even more recent. 
Women who are only slightly older than myself tell of a youth in The 
Netherlands in which the parents decreed that the boys should have 
higher education and the girls quit school at a young age or attend a 
domestic science school. Today, in many countries in the world, wo-
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men are still deprived of the right to education. This can be because 
of poverty, ignorance, social conventions, sexism, or religious 
convictions. Literacy statistics give an indication of how widespread 
the exclusion of women from education is. The ratio of literacy of 
women to men is, for example 35% in Nepal, 37% in Sierra Leone, 
27% in Sudan, 32% in Afghanistan and 50% in South Asia. Two 
thirds of illiterate people in the world are women. In higher edu-
cation, the gap between men and women is even greater (Nuss-
baum, 1999:31). In western countries, especially those with a large 
immigrant population, there is also a gap between literacy rates of 
men and women. 
Many people are of the opinion that women in all countries of the 
world should have access to education. In this article, I will call this 
the universalist position. There are others – philosophers, anthro-
pologists and economists – who argue that, because there is strong 
resistance to the education of women in some cultures, education 
for women should not be imposed on those cultures. This would 
constitute the imposition on them of western values. I will call this 
the pluralist position. 
In various publications, Martha Nussbaum describes the discussion 
between the universalist and the pluralist positions as it took place 
within WIDER (World Institute for Development Economics Re-
search), a think-tank set up and sponsored by the United Nations 
(Nussbaum, 1998:766-784; 1999:35-37). Nussbaum criticises a cer-
tain form of pluralism, stating:  
Under the banner of their fashionable opposition to universalism 
march ancient religious taboos, the luxury of the pampered 
husband, educational deprivation, unequal health care, and 
premature death. (Nussbaum, 1999:36.)  
Educational deprivation for women is, according to Nussbaum, one 
of the results of not seeing education as a value to be universally 
implemented.  
The fact that Nussbaum supports the education of women does not, 
however, mean that she has a rigid universalist position or that she 
completely rejects pluralism. Her aim is to create a philosophical 
view in which she does justice to what she considers to be the 
legitimate claims of both. In this article, I would like to give several 
examples of how Nussbaum seeks to close the gap between uni-
versalism and pluralism with respect to the education of women and 
I will ask to what extent she succeeds in doing so. 
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I will begin by showing that Nussbaum believes education for wo-
men to be a great good. It is, according to her, one of the funda-
mental capabilities needed for women to live a flourishing life. I will 
then discuss three arguments which Nussbaum uses to close the 
gap between a universalist and a pluralist position, namely argu-
ments concerning the identification of a culture, group or tradition, 
her discussion concerning the notion of preferences and her view on 
freedom of religion. I will also suggest that two concepts which 
Nussbaum introduces can be valuable for closing the gap which 
inevitably remains between pluralism and universalism, namely that 
of context and that of practical judgement.  
2. Education for women as a specific good 
Nussbaum includes education in her list of capabilities. Capabilities 
are goods which all people are entitled to. Capabilities enable peo-
ple to lead flourishing lives. The capabilities concern fundamental 
matters such as being able to live a human life to its normal length, 
having access to medical care, nourishment and shelter. However, 
being able to live a truly human life also includes capabilities such 
as being able to have attachments, having a normal emotional deve-
lopment, and being able to plan one’s life by the use of practical rea-
son. There are also elements taken up in the capabilities list which 
have the character of rights, namely the right of free affiliation, pro-
tection against discrimination, the right to work, being able to par-
ticipate in the political process and being able to hold property.  
Nussbaum (1999:78-79) describes the capability concerning educa-
tion as follows.  
Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason – 
and to do these things in a ‘truly human’ way, a way informed 
and cultivated by adequate education, including, but by no 
means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific 
training. 
Besides this specific reference to education, education is implied in 
a number of other capabilities – for example being able to express 
oneself artistically, having freedom of expression, being able to par-
ticipate in the political process, and being able to work and seek 
employment on an equal basis with others (Nussbaum, 1999:78-80). 
Nussbaum notes that her capabilities are intertwined – that the ca-
pabilities form a whole and that the loss of certain capabilities entails 
the loss of other capabilities.  
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The basis for formulating the capabilities lies in the philosophies of 
Aristotle and Kant. From Aristotle, Nussbaum takes the notion that 
specific values must be realised for people to flourish. In addition, 
Aristotle believes that these values apply to all people and are 
therefore universal. Nussbaum (1999:38) quotes Aristotle by saying:  
One may observe in one’s travels to distant countries the feel-
ings of recognition and affiliation that link every human being to 
every other human being.  
From Kant, she takes the notion that people have dignity and worth, 
that they are ends in themselves and not means to other ends 
(Nussbaum, 2000:73). She regards the capabilities as realisations of 
these Kantian values. Finally, Nussbaum (2000:150-151) speaks of 
an intuitive notion of the good when she states:  
[T]he capabilities view embodies an intuitively powerful idea of 
truly human functioning that has deep roots in many different 
traditions. I have used this intuitive idea to justify the list and its 
political role. 
Not all philosophers agree with Nussbaum that making a list of 
capabilities is a wise strategy for creating a view of society which en-
courages flourishing. Sen, for example believes that the best stra-
tegy to achieve such a goal is to develop indexes which make clear 
what specific groups of people, in concrete circumstances, in a spe-
cific country, are capable of being and doing. The GNP (gross na-
tional product) is an inadequate measure of capability, because a 
country can have a large GNP and at the same time have a great 
number of people who live in poverty, unable to realise a minimal 
standard of living. Examples of indexes which are more precise in 
this respect are the Human Development Index, the Gender-Dis-
parity Adjusted HDI, the Gender-Related Development Index and 
the Gender Empowerment Measure (Nussbaum, 1998:782-783). 
This is a much broader and more abstract notion of capability than 
Nussbaum (1999:12) has.  
Nussbaum argues that the list of capabilities is based on the general 
theoretical principle that there are universal values which must be 
realised for all people to have a truly human existence. However, 
contrary to Sen, Nussbaum sees no reason why the philosopher 
should limit him-/herself to abstract principles and not formulate spe-
cific values. This concreteness encourages the setting of specific 
goals to be realised. According to Nussbaum, setting specific goals 
does not imply imposing these goals on people, because the capa-
bilities are opportunities to be realised and not prescriptions (Nuss-
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baum, 2000:105). They are therefore responsive to public reason-
ing. Actual functioning is a matter which people must decide for 
themselves. Furthermore, she argues in response to Sen that all the 
elements in her list are equally important and exist in interplay with 
each other. It is not an issue of making priorities or a selection as he 
suggests. Finally, she states that the list is tentative and open to 
revision. In this sense, it could be more or less specific.   
It has been argued that by making a list, one has already made 
choices for people, choices which they themselves should be able to 
make. Nelson (2008:115) states that 
Neither primary goods [Rawls] nor ‘central capabilities’ [Nuss-
baum] are things we all want no matter what else we want; the 
act of making a list is therefore inherently sectarian.  
By this he implies that any formulation of concrete goals by philo-
sophers will stand in the way of the freedom of a democratic, liberal 
society to make its own choices as to which values to implement 
(Nelson, 2008:115). To this Nussbaum responds that she respects 
the choices made by a liberal, democratic society. This respect for 
freedom of choice is moreover based on her conviction that the 
power of moral choice is one of the constituents of human dignity 
(Nussbaum, 1999:57). 
3. The tension between universalism and pluralism 
Nussbaum argues that it is possible for the philosopher to formulate 
specific capabilities and that one such capability is the right to 
education. At the same time, Nussbaum describes education as a 
universal value. By this Nussbaum means that if something is seen 
as good it should be considered to be universally applicable. Some-
thing which is good, is good for all people at all times. This is 
because, as Aristotle says in the quotation given above, we all share 
in the same human condition. 
At the same time, as we have just seen, Nussbaum claims to do 
justice to pluralism, stating that she respects the choices made by a 
liberal, democratic society. In such a society, goods are realised with 
the consent of society itself. Nussbaum argues that it is possible to 
subscribe to certain values and consider them universal goods while 
at the same time respecting cultural differences and the freedom of 
people to make their own decisions. Nussbaum (1999:8) writes in 
Sex and social justice: 
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These essays … try to show that a universal account of human 
justice need not be insensitive to the variety of traditions or a 
mere projection of narrow Western values onto groups with 
different concerns. 
In her book Women and human development, Nussbaum (2000: 
105) speaks of “legitimate worries about universalism”, that is wor-
ries that universalism can lead to tyranny and of our desire to alle-
viate these worries. 
Nussbaum attempts to reduce the tension between universalism and 
pluralism by investigating the presuppositions of these points of 
view. I will illustrate this by giving three examples of how Nussbaum 
wishes to achieve this. The first example is the issue of how to 
identify a culture, group, tradition or religion. 
4. Identifying a culture, group, tradition or religion 
Pluralism seeks to respect the opinions of specific religions, tra-
ditions, groups or cultures. It is, however, very difficult to identify 
these social entities. To go back to the earlier example, the Dutch 
parents who denied their daughters an education 60 years ago 
could be seen to form a group in society. However, there was also a 
group of parents who were open to education for their daughters. 
Which of these two groups represented Dutch culture at that time? 
Or, did both groups form part of a culture which was itself divided? If 
we have trouble identifying our own traditions, this is all the more so 
in the case of traditions and cultures which are foreign to us. Do the 
Taliban in Afghanistan represent the view of that culture on the 
education of women or are the true representatives of Afghan cul-
ture those people who send their daughters to school?  
Nussbaum argues that there is a general tendency in the West to 
interpret other cultures in terms of its most repressive elements. This 
is all the more so the case when it involves a description of a Third 
World culture from a colonialist perspective. She gives the example 
of the British interpretation of the culture of India. The colonialists 
decreed that Indian culture was backward, contrasting it to the so-
called enlightened British culture. Nussbaum (2000:47) writes:  
The British in India harped continually on elements of Indian 
culture that they could easily portray as retrograde; they sought 
to identify these as ‘Indian culture’, and critical values (es-
pecially those favoring women’s progress) as British importa-
tions.  
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The point which Nussbaum makes can also be made for religions. In 
the media, one sees a tendency to interpret Islam in its most re-
pressive forms, especially when it comes to its treatment of women. 
Should there not be more attention paid to enlightened schools of 
thought in Islam? Nussbaum notes that also in the case of Hinduism 
in India, it is possible to focus on repressive or on enlightened forms. 
Some forms of Hindu law in India, for example mandate polygamy 
and forbid divorce while “one recognised system of Hindu law 
already mandated monogamy and gave women divorce rights”. 
Nussbaum asks what a “typical” group is within a culture containing 
an “average” person. How do we select which groups we focus on 
when it comes to women’s liberation? Do we choose a group op-
posed to the emancipation of women? Or do we take as typical of a 
culture a group of women who work in a collective set up by an aid 
agency? Or women who make use of microcredit to set up busines-
ses? Or is the group we choose to see as exemplary one of well-
educated feminists working for the emancipation of women in their 
culture?  
Nussbaum (1999:9) at one point asks:  
What is East and what is West? What is the tradition of a 
person who is fighting for freedom and empowerment? Why 
should one’s group be assumed to be the ethnic or religious 
group of one’s birth? Might it not, if one so chooses, be, or 
become, the international group of women – or of people who 
respect the equality and dignity of women?  
Nussbaum, as a representative of United Nations development pro-
jects, met with groups of women participating in projects focused on 
emancipation. This is the reason why she mentions those groups. 
One can ask how typical such groups are of the culture – on what 
basis do we make a selection? In her writing, Nussbaum herself 
makes selections. She makes use of a narrative method in which 
she takes specific stories of Third World women she met as illustra-
tions of her theories. In Women and human development (Nuss-
baum, 2000), she tells the stories of Vasanti and Jayamma. By 
weaving her philosophy around these stories, Nussbaum selects the 
women she sees as illustrative of the philosophical points she wish-
es to make (Jaggar, 2006:306, 320). Once more, the difficult issue 
of selection arises. It can be argued that if one is claiming that all 
voices in a tradition or culture should be heard, then this applies to 
both the traditional and the emancipatory elements in the culture. 
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Nussbaum also discusses the concept of tradition. She argues that, 
because cultures change, we cannot impose a rigid notion of tradi-
tion on cultures. Nussbaum (1999:37) states:  
Real cultures contain plurality and conflict, tradition, and sub-
version. They borrow good things from wherever they find them, 
none too worried about purity. We would never tolerate a claim 
that women in our own society must embrace traditions that 
arose thousands of years ago – indeed we are proud that we 
have no such traditions. Isn’t it condescending then, to treat 
Indian and Chinese women as bound by the past in ways that 
we are not?  
Nusbaum argues that it is not easy to identify a culture, tradition, 
group or religion. These social formations are divided and in contin-
uous change. They contain both traditional and non-traditional ele-
ments. Nussbaum attempts to diminish the gap between universa-
lism and pluralism by pointing to the fact that identifying these social 
entities is a matter of interpretation. Furthermore, by focusing on the 
elements which are more in line with the universalist project she 
seeks to diminish the appeal of pluralists to traditional elements as 
representative of a culture. This is, I think, a wise strategy. The 
question can, however, be asked if Nussbaum succeeds in closing 
the gap between universalism and pluralism. The universalist and 
the pluralist can on this reading continue making interpretive choices 
which emphasise their differences.  
5. The role of preferences 
A second way in which Nussbaum attempts to diminish the gap 
between universalism and pluralism is by means of an examination 
of the notion of preferences. Pluralism seems to be committed to 
take preferences as normative, universalism seems to ignore them 
by imposing values on people.  
In her book Women and human development, Nussbaum (2000: 
111-166) discusses preference in the light of preference-based 
theories as they have been developed in the field of economics. In 
economics, the question can be asked whether a society should 
reflect and respect the preferences of people or not. If people have a 
preference for a massive consumption of goods should economics 
and society enable them to exercise this preference, or are there 
other goals which a society should strive for, for example the just 
distribution of wealth or concern for the environment? These goals 
could be at odds with the preferences of people within a society. 
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In preference-based theories of economics, it is argued that econo-
mics should strive to realise what people want. Opponents to 
preference-based theories argue that economics should not simply 
be based on preferences since preferences can be deformed or 
uninformed (Nussbaum, 2000:119-135). Massive consumption of 
goods, for example, could prove to be a deformed and uninformed 
preference.   
Applying the notion of preferences to the capabilities, Nussbaum be-
lieves that not wanting to realise certain capabilities, such as edu-
cation, comes from having deformed or uninformed preferences. 
She argues that one can identify a preference as deformed when it 
is formed under duress. It can be uninformed if one is simply 
unaware of what a great good the alternative in fact is. Nussbaum 
supports her view that preferences can be deformed or uninformed 
by pointing out what happens when a capability which people at first 
did not prefer, is realised in a society. Nussbaum claims that once 
people have access to clean water, medical care, or education they 
will not want to go back to the situation in which they did not have 
these things. With respect to education, Nussbaum speaks of the joy 
which people experience when they become literate. In addition, 
education opens up all sorts of opportunities which people in the 
past did not have, not the least of which is the opportunity for 
employment and the development of a country.  
Granting Nussbaum the point that some preferences are better than 
others, it is nevertheless possible to ask if one can speak of a clear 
distinction between informed preferences on the one hand and  un-
informed or deformed preferences on the other. Perhaps some pre-
ferences fall in a category between informed and uninformed, or per-
haps our judgement as to what is informed and uninformed changes 
in the course of time. The notion of preference is, therefore, subject 
to interpretation within a culture.  
Because of her respect for a liberal and democratic society, Nuss-
baum speaks of the importance of respecting the preferences of 
people. However, at the same time she believes in the “substantive 
good”. By the substantive good Nussbaum refers to a Platonic no-
tion of the good – something which is simply good, regardless of the 
fact of whether or not people recognise it as good. She concludes 
her discussion of preference-based theories versus a theory based 
on the notion of the substantive good with a clear statement in 
favour of the substantive good.  
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While not dismissing desire, as I have said, while keeping it 
around as a witness and respecting it as an intelligent part of 
the human personality – we had better take our stand squarely 
in the camp of the substantive good. (Nussbaum, 2000:166.) 
The idea that there is a substantive good, regardless of whether or 
not people prefer this good, may seem to tip the scales of Nuss-
baum’s position towards the universalist side. Moreover, the sub-
stantive good, that which is good for you, seems to lend itself to 
being imposed on people. Nussbaum, however, argues that it is not 
simply a question of the imposition of a good. Rather, in order for 
goods to be implemented, people will need to recognise the value of 
these goods. Therefore, even though she takes her stand in the 
camp of the substantive good, this is not a good which is completely 
cut off from preferences. 
By arguing that society need not respect all preferences on the 
ground that not all preferences are informed and good for people, 
Nussbaum questions an important presupposition of the pluralist po-
sition. At the same time, by arguing that the substantive good needs 
affirmation through the preferences of people, she questions the 
idea that a universalist position consists of the mere imposition of 
values. The pluralist is forced to admit that there can be good things 
which are to some extent separate from preferences and the 
universalist must admit that people need to affirm the substantive 
good. In this way, another step is taken in closing the gap between 
universalism and pluralism. At the same time, the gap is not com-
pletely closed, because when difficult decisions have to be made, 
the pluralist may perhaps choose a preference-based good while the 
universalist will choose for imposition of a value.  
6. Freedom of religion 
A last example which I would like to give of the way in which Nuss-
baum attempts to close the gap between a pluralist and a univer-
salist position regards religion. Respect for freedom of religion is 
often used by pluralists as an argument against the introduction of 
certain new values. Some religious groups argue that women should 
not be educated, because the religion forbids it. The best known 
example today is that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, but the oppo-
sition of religious groups to the education of women is much more 
widespread. Nussbaum (1999:30) gives the example of Bangladeshi 
women who were threatened by religious leaders with breaking their 
legs if they went to literacy classes. However abhorrent this example 
may be, it confronts us with the issue of respect for freedom of 
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religion. Nussbaum (2000:167-240; 2008) considers this question of 
utmost importance, discussing it at length in various publications.  
Religion can form a significant barrier to the acceptance of equality 
for women. According to Charlesworth, the ratification process of the 
United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women of 1979, also known as the Women’s 
Convention, demonstrates that states use religion as a reason for 
not agreeing to the principle of equal rights for women. Charlesworth 
(2000:67) writes:  
Islamic states are still considered parties to the Women’s 
Convention although they have rejected the equality provisions 
that are at its heart.   
Surprisingly, however, Charlesworth (2000:67) continues:  
Israel, India and the United Kingdom have entered reservations 
making the laws of religious communities immune to the 
conventions’ guarantee of sex equality. Other states, such as 
Australia, have not formally made reservations precluding the 
application of the principle of sex equality to religious com-
munities, but they have exempted religions from the principle in 
legislation designed to implement the Women’s Convention.  
This shows that religion can be used as a motive for rejecting equal 
rights for women. This is not only the case in non-western countries, 
but in a number of western countries as well. 
Nussbaum recognises that religion is a powerful influence and that it 
can be used to block the implementation of what she considers to be 
important values in a society. At the same time, she believes strong-
ly in respect for religious freedom. She has written extensively on 
this topic, dedicating a book called Liberty of conscience (Nuss-
baum, 2008) to this issue in the United States. While arguing for 
capabilities and universal values on the one hand, Nussbaum ar-
gues that, on the other hand, religion does have a certain privileged 
status in society and that one cannot simply impose values on 
religions. Central to her notions concerning freedom of religion are 
the principles of non-establishment and free exercise (Nussbaum, 
2000:189). Non-establishment refers to the fact that in the United 
States there is no “established”, that is official, religion. Free exer-
cise means that people are in principle free to exercise their religion.  
Examples of her discussions of freedom of religion in the United 
States are issues concerning the right of the Roman Catholic 
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Church to ban women from priestly office, the right of some Mormon 
sects to practice polygamy, the right of Seventh Day Adventists to 
claim Saturday as a day free from work, and the right to use drugs in 
certain religious rituals (Nussbaum, 2000:167-240). Nussbaum ar-
gues that the state should respect religious convictions as long as 
these practices do not harm society as a whole. She calls this the 
principle of moral constraint (Nussbaum, 2000:190). At the same 
time, Nussbaum (2000:198) believes that “compelling state inte-
rests” must not be undermined by religious practices. Allowing the 
peyote ceremony in North American Indian religious rituals, for 
example does not constitute a legal basis for social tolerance for 
drug use outside of this religious practice (Nussbaum, 2000:208). 
This means that there are no moral constraints or compelling state 
interests to forbid such a ceremony. These principles, however, are 
difficult to apply and as Nussbaum demonstrates, different American 
courts have made different decisions throughout time in the cases 
she discusses.   
In Women and human development, Nussbaum discusses one parti-
cular case which concerns the relation between religious conviction 
and the right to education. This is the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder 
before the courts in the United States in which the Amish argued 
that they would like to take their children from school at the age of 
fourteen, thus denying them secondary education. The Amish 
argued that their religious tradition demanded that they withdraw 
their children from the secular world at this age, teaching them skills 
of farming and domestic labour (Nussbaum, 2000:232-233). The 
Supreme Court ruled that the law mandating education until the age 
of sixteen posed a “substantial burden” for the free exercise of the 
religious convictions of the Amish and that the state had failed to 
show that there was a compelling interest to mandate education until 
the age of sixteen. It was noted by the Supreme Court that the 
educational system should ensure that children be made into self 
reliant citizens and able to participate in the political process. 
However, in the case of the Amish, it had been demonstrated that 
they do not “place burdens on society through their educational 
shortcomings” (Nussbaum, 2000:233). 
Nussbaum agrees in principle with the Supreme Court’s decision, 
yet at the same time she expresses a number of reservations. First-
ly, she states that there is “an element of tragedy” in this decision. 
Young people loose the right to education, because of respect for 
freedom of religion (Nussbaum, 2000:212). Secondly, she returns to 
a point made earlier, that religions can change in the course of time 
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(Nussbaum, 2000:212). Thirdly, she notes that the difficulty here is 
“a use of judgment in its application to the particular” and that “an 
irreducible element of judgment remains” (Nussbaum, 2000:212). I 
will return to this notion of judgement in the next section of this 
article, because I think it is an important idea. 
It is clear from these observations that Nussbaum deplores this 
decision on the one hand and that, on the other hand, she wishes to 
respect freedom of religion if there is no compelling interest to 
violate that freedom. Taking up this discussion later in her book, 
Nussbaum (2000:233) notes:  
This is truly a hard case for my approach; indeed, it shows 
exactly where the line drawn by my approach falls. 
At this point, she makes a fourth observation, that while boys will 
learn skills such as farming and carpentry which they can use every-
where, girls learn to perform domestic tasks, skills which are not 
very valuable if they choose to leave the Amish community. She, 
therefore, concludes that if the court had considered the question of 
the gender of the children, an argument could be made that there 
really is a compelling interest to forbid taking the children from 
school (Nussbaum, 2000:233).   
I have gone into the discussion of the right of the Amish to deny their 
children secondary education at length in order to illustrate how 
difficult it is, even in a modern society such as that of the United 
States, to reconcile the right to education with the right to the free 
exercise of religion. In addition, women’s rights make this issue all 
the more complicated. 
From this discussion, we can see that Nussbaum rejects both an 
extreme pluralist position and an extreme universalist position. She 
argues that religious freedom is not absolute. At the same time, the 
universalist cannot impose values on religious communities at will. 
Yet, a gap remains between the pluralist and the universalist. This 
gap can lead to tragic decisions being made in which interests of 
equal value are weighed against each other.  
Nussbaum seeks to close the gap by arguing that religions evolve, 
presumably to positions which are more in line with the universalist 
approach. Yet, precisely in this point there lies a great difficulty. 
Some religions evolve to more fundamentalist forms, with the result 
that the differences with liberalism become greater, not less. Fun-
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damentalists are usually not open to compromise with the universa-
list or to the interference of the state with their convictions. 
Another way of closing the gap, but one which Nussbaum does not 
consider, would be through changes in the universalist position. The 
universalist position could in theory alter in response to religious 
impulses. However, the gap could also widen because of changes in 
the universalist position. It could also be possible for the universalist 
position to take on forms which take it further from a pluralist posi-
tion.  
7. Context and practical judgement  
Nussbaum presents a number of arguments by means of which she 
wishes to close the gap between a pluralist and a universalist posi-
tion. As I have shown, however, these arguments cannot completely 
bridge these two positions. I would, therefore, like to introduce two 
additional notions which may be helpful in closing the gap further, 
namely those of context and of practical judgement.  
Nussbaum argues that education should take place within the con-
text of the society in which it is offered. In Sex and social justice, she 
gives the example of Martha Chen’s literacy project in Bangladesh. 
Once the female students were literate, the women were given work 
in “… jobs that looked continuous with traditional female work but 
were outside the home and brought in wages” (Nussbaum, 1999: 
51). Nussbaum (1999:51-52) notes further that the women con-
vinced the men that the changes were not threatening and were 
good for the whole group. Nussbaum does not endorse this strategy 
as ideal, noting that it does not solve the problem of the subor-
dination of women. Yet, the introduction of literacy education and the 
resulting changes in role divisions between men and women are 
here placed within the context of the lives of the people in the 
Bangladeshi village. Along the same lines, it could be argued that 
the content of the education being offered should be within the 
context of the cultures within which it takes place. 
The notion of context is an important one if one wishes to close the 
gap between pluralism and universalism. Universal values can be 
introduced into local contexts and can even be modified by those 
contexts. At the same time, the values can alter the contexts. Once 
literacy has been introduced into a society, the circumstances under 
which people live change. It is possible that a small change such as 
literacy has radical implications in the long run.  
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At the same time, the notion of context raises the issue of inter-
pretation once again. Which context should be taken as normative? 
Do all contexts have an equal claim to legitimacy? Nussbaum won-
ders whether it is good to compromise when it comes to the sub-
ordination of women just to ensure that the greater good, the edu-
cational project, can continue.  
A second notion which may be helpful to close the gap between uni-
versalism and pluralism is that of “judgment in application to the par-
ticular”, an expression Nussbaum uses in her discussion of freedom 
of religion. Reconciling the claims to universal values with the right 
of people to make their own choices, is a matter of carefully weigh-
ing options. This weighing of options is a matter of using practical 
reason. The fact that people must make concrete decisions in prac-
tice may lessen the theoretical gap between universalism and plura-
lism. However, this appeal to practice leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of principle – the grounds on which the practical decisions are 
based. 
8. Conclusion 
I have considered two opinions concerning education for women, 
namely that it is a universal good which must be implemented every-
where, and that it is a western value which should not be implemen-
ted if a culture opposes it. I have called these positions universalist 
and pluralist. In this article, I have given examples of how Nussbaum 
wishes to close the gap between these positions, taking as point of 
departure her claim that universalism need not be insensitive to plu-
ralist concerns. I discussed her arguments for this position as well 
as her notions of context and practical judgement.  
I have argued that, although Nussbaum has succeeded to some ex-
tent to close the gap, the gap remains. At a certain point, difficult 
choices have to be made, choices in which either the pluralist posi-
tion or the universalist position will prevail. Nussbaum (1999:49) 
clearly states that if it comes to that point, especially when it comes 
to education, she will choose the universalist side. This is the side of 
the “substantive good”. The very fact that Nussbaum feels she has 
to make a choice for this pole means that, despite her attempts to 
resolve the issues, she realises that a complete reconciliation of 
pluralism with universalism may not be possible. In this article I have 
tried to point out some of the reasons why this is the case.  
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